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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3279 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
NATHANIEL PITTS, 
                Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00703-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2016 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 1, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Nathaniel Pitts appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying his motion  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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for the return of property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) and denying his motion for 
reconsideration of that ruling.  We will vacate the District Court’s orders and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
 Pitts is serving a federal prison sentence imposed for various drug and weapons 
convictions.  See United States v. Pitts, 497 F. App’x 252 (3d Cir. 2012).  At issue here is 
a Rule 41(g) motion that Pitts filed seeking the return of various items of property that he 
alleges the Government seized from his automobiles and his house.  The property in 
question consists of two cellular phones and $205 in currency allegedly seized from 
Pitts’s GMC Envoy and the other property noted in the margin.1   
 The Government responded with a declaration by Frank Costobile, who is a 
Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”).  Agent Costobile 
stated that he reviewed the DEA’s records and that, with the exception of a passport and 
certain checks that the Government already had returned to Pitts’s girlfriend, the DEA 
had no record of ever taking possession of any of the items sought by Pitts.  
 The next day, and without giving Pitts an opportunity to reply to Agent 
Costobile’s declaration or the Government’s response, the District Court denied Pitts’s 
Rule 41(g) motion in a summary order that merely referenced them.  Pitts later filed a 
reply to the Government’s response along with a motion for reconsideration.  Pitts 
                                              
1 The other items are an air pump, jumper cables, barber clippers with an apron, a 
basketball, a gym bag with workout clothing, a tool set, an iPod, an additional $200 in 
currency, a black leather jacket, dress shoes and an outfit, a DVD player, 20 DVDs, and 
Pitts’s passport and check books.  
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attached evidence suggesting that the Government may indeed have taken possession of 
his two cellular phones and $205 in currency.  After receiving Pitts’s reply, the 
Government requested additional time to respond.  The Government also notified the 
District Court that “government counsel has requested DEA agents assigned to this case 
to make further attempts to locate any of the defendant’s property and/or determine the 
disposition of such property.”  (ECF No. 161.)   
 Rather than await the results of the Government’s investigation and the 
Government’s response, the District Court denied Pitts’s motion for reconsideration the 
following day.  The District Court did so without acknowledging any of Pitts’s evidence 
or the fact that the Government itself was continuing to investigate the matter.  Pitts now 
appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders. 
II. 
 A Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property is an independent civil action for 
equitable relief.  See United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(addressing former Rule 41(e)).  If a defendant files such a motion after the conclusion of 
criminal proceedings, the burden is on the Government to “demonstrate that it has a 
legitimate reason to retain the property.”  Id. at 377.  “The burden on the government is 
heavy because there is a presumption that the person from whom the property was taken 
has a right to its return.”  United States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Thus, in addressing Rule 41(g) motions, the District Court generally must undertake at 
least some inquiry into whether the Government retains possession of the property and 
why.  See Chambers, 192 F.3d at 377-78; see also Albinson, 356 F.3d at 281-82, 284 n.9 
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(summarizing district courts’ obligations under Chambers and to pro se litigants); Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(g) (providing that the District Court must “receive evidence on any factual 
issue necessary to decide the motion”).  We review the District Court’s resolution of such 
motions for abuse of discretion.  See Chambers, 192 F.3d at 376.2 
 In this case, the District Court erred by failing to reconsider its order denying 
Pitts’s motion because Pitts, who had no prior opportunity to respond to Agent 
Costobile’s declaration, presented evidence calling that declaration into question and 
raising factual issues that the District Court should have addressed.  Indeed, the 
Government itself appeared to recognize as much because it notified the District Court 
that its investigation was continuing and requested an opportunity to file an additional 
response.  The District Court provided no explanation for instead summarily denying 
reconsideration in the face of the Government’s request.  If the District Court had awaited 
the Government’s response, then it could and should have resolved factual disputes that 
the parties raised and that are continuing even on appeal. 
 For example, the Government initially relied on Agent Costobile’s declaration in 
arguing that it never seized or possessed Pitts’s two cellular phones.  On appeal, however, 
the Government asserts that its continuing investigation has revealed that it does in fact 
possess those cellular phones as Pitts alleged.  That assertion both undermines the District 
Court’s reliance on Agent Costobile’s declaration and gives rise to a separate factual 
                                              
2 Motions for reconsideration are appropriately filed in Rule 41(g) proceedings, see 
United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2000), and we review the denial of 
such motions for abuse of discretion as well, see Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 
(3d Cir. 2015).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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issue.  For the first time on appeal, the Government argues that it is permitted to retain 
Pitts’s cellular phones for any evidentiary issues that may arise from his continued filings 
in the District Court.  Pitts argues in his reply brief that it is not necessary for the 
Government to retain the cellular phones because an expert downloaded all of the 
information from those phones and because the Government possesses that information 
as well.  Pitts also has attached evidence to that effect.  Thus, whether the Government 
has a legitimate reason to retain the two cellular phones that it now concedes it possesses 
is a disputed factual issue that the District Court should resolve in the first instance. 
 The parties’ filings reveal one other disputed factual issue as well.  Pitts sought the 
return of $205 in currency that he claims the Government seized, but the Government 
argued on the basis of Agent Costobile’s declaration that it never seized the currency.  
Pitts attached to his reply in the District Court an arrest report stating that a Police Officer 
Brady seized the $205 that Pitts is seeking.  The District Court did not address that 
evidence, and the parties have raised additional factual issues concerning the $205 on 
appeal.  The Government argues on appeal that Officer Brady’s arrest report does not 
show that the DEA itself took possession of the $205.  Pitts counters with evidence in the 
form of Officer Brady’s testimony at trial that he gave everything he recovered to a DEA 
agent.  Thus, Pitts’s request for the return of the $205 in currency also raises factual 
issues that the District Court should resolve. 
  We will remand for the District Court to address in the first instance these factual 
issues and any others necessary to decide Pitts’s Rule 41(g) motion.  In that regard, we 
have held that “[t]he District Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on any disputed 
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issue of fact necessary to the resolution of the [Rule 41(g)] motion.”  Chambers, 192 F.3d 
at 378.  We later clarified that Chambers does not require a hearing to resolve every 
factual dispute and that “affidavits or documentary evidence, such as chain of custody 
records, may be sufficient to support a fact finder’s determination” in an appropriate case.  
Albinson, 356 F.3d at 282.   
 We leave it to the District Court to determine whether a hearing is necessary or 
whether such documentary evidence as has been or may be presented may prove 
sufficient to resolve the parties’ factual disputes.   
III. 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s orders and remand for 
further proceedings.  We express no opinion on the merits of Pitts’s Rule 41(g) motion. 
